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Abstract
Purpose: This article offers a critical view of  the impact of  patents on economic activity. The article
questions whether a strengthening of  the patent system is optimal in economic terms, from a business
and social perspective.
Design/methodology/approach: We develop two analytic innovation models. They help us to
understand how the strength of  the patent system affects 1) the industry profits 2) the social welfare.
Findings: The strengthening of  patent systems could cause a decline in the activities of  imitation and,
therefore, a decrease in competition, a reduction in the production and assimilation of  new technologies
and could create barriers to entry into technology-intensive sectors, increasing the costs of  production.
We will show that a lower strength patent system and an increase in the activities of  imitation can i)
increase the benefits to industry as a whole ii) lead to greater social surplus.
Research limitations/implications: The final set of  sustainability-related issues (and drivers)
presented aren’t exhaustive and are delimited by the particular scenario generated around Aqualogy’s
business scope; therefore, it cannot be considered as a standard application mode.
Originality/value: Much of  the literature on innovation has traditionally seen imitation processes as
harmful to the development of  new technologies, and detrimental to the welfare of  consumers,
producers and society at large. That is why policies aimed at strengthening the patent system and
discouraging imitation processes are associated with improvements in social welfare, -fostering
innovation, trade, foreign investment and technology transfer-. However, our findings should lead us to
rethink how optimal innovation policy should be designed. The problems associated with restrictions on
the free market involve costs that outweigh the social benefits that patents can provide. Market
mechanisms can effectively reward innovators for being the first to bring a product into the market,
without the need to grant a monopoly.
Keywords: imitation, innovation, patent system, social welfare
Jel Codes: O31, O34, L43
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1. Introduction
The recent economic literature finds innovation to have an essential role in economic growth (Helpman, 2004;
Aghion & Howitt, 2009; Acemoglu, 2009; Benhabib, Perla & Tonetti, 2014). Within this literature, the processes
of  R&D and technical progress are linked, inextricably, to the development and strength of  the patent system
(Romer, 1990). Patents allow innovators to recoup some of  the huge benefits that their ideas generate and to
amortize the high costs of  R&D in which they have incurred until the commercial exploitation of  their
innovations. If  their ideas are copied immediately after they appear, this could be a disincentive for innovators, so
perfect competition should be restricted for a period of  time for inventors to recover their investments and to
promote the development of  new ideas. 
However, in the market, the presence of  imitators is common. They coexist with the patent holders and take
advantage of  new ideas clandestinely. Consequently, imitation is a phenomenon inherent and inextricably linked
to the innovation process. Even so, surprisingly, as Eaton and Kortum (1996), Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister
(1997), Mukoyama (2003), Perez-Sebastian (2007) and Johns (2009) point out, most theoretical and empirical
literature has refused to recognize the coexistence of  innovation and imitation processes or to give the latter the
relevance they deserve in the growth literature. Economic models usually consider that the mechanisms that
safeguard intellectual property rights (IPR) work efficiently. In these models, monopoly systems derived from the
exploitation of  patents become mechanisms that encourage the creative process and ensure economic prosperity.
When imitation processes are taken into account, they are found to be harmful: they plunder the profits of
innovators, discourage the development of  innovation and are detrimental to growth (Grossman & Helpman
1991a, Segerstrom, 1991; Davidson & Segerstrom, 1998). 
However, more and more scholars disagree and argue that imitation processes can have a positive impact on
innovation by fostering competition and can contribute decisively to the economic growth of  developing
countries -and even developed ones. Following this line of  argument, this paper attempts to explore the positive
aspects of  imitation processes on economic activity. Furthermore, contrary to the most widespread view, the
paper questions whether a strengthening of  the patent system is optimal in economic terms. 
The work is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the conceptual framework of  the economic effects of
imitation processes. Section 3 analyses what tools can help to strengthen the patent system and the consequences
that this policy would have on the processes of  innovation and imitation. Sections 4 and 5 set out two models
that show that an increase in the activities of  imitation, driven by a lower strength patent system, could lead to
higher profits for industry and to greater social welfare. Finally, we draw the main conclusions from the paper. 
2. The processes of  imitation and its effects on the economy 
The concepts of  imitation and innovation have traditionally been antagonistic in the literature. For Sohn (2008,
p.75) "imitation, as opposed to innovation, is the act of  copying or mimicking the action of  others". Similarly,
Greenhalgh and Rogers (2010, p. 5) consider that novelty is an inherent characteristic of  innovation so that a key
issue is "to distinguish innovation, the bringing to the market of  a truly novel item, from imitation, the adoption
of  a new technique or design that is already in the market". This antagonism between the two processes leads to
a series of  negative and inaccurate beliefs about the processes of  imitation. Two of  the most common are: 
1. To consider that the processes of  imitation have little merit from a technical point of  view, and are little
more than just reverse engineering. 
2. To assume, in general terms, that imitation is detrimental to innovation and has serious consequences for
the welfare of  consumers, producers and society as a whole. 
Regarding the first statement, and despite what is commonly thought, Baumol (2004) maintains that imitations
have, in many cases, an important innovative component. So, imitators need to adapt products to specific market
circumstances, such as the availability of  inputs necessary for their manufacturing, consumer preferences and
market size. Moreover, these technologies can incorporate many improvements in quality, reliability or ease of
use. Studies such as those of  Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner (1981), Levin, Klevorick, Nelson & Winter (1987)
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and Harabi (1991) empirically confirm that imitation can be more complicated and costly than it may seem at
first sight. These three papers show that the ratio of  the costs of  imitation divided by the costs of  R&D of  the
innovation is between 0.4 and 0.9, depending on the complexity of  the product and on whether it is patented or
not, a factor that complicates the copying process and make it more expensive. Similarly, the time spent on
imitation is between 10 months and 2 years, depending on the same characteristics. This means a cost ranging
from 0.4 of  the time devoted to the innovation to a period that can be longer than that of  the innovation
process. In many cases, imitation requires tacit knowledge or know-how that the imitating firm does not own and
that are relatively inaccessible, at least initially. Along with the high costs, there are other elements that may
discourage imitators, such as not having a recognized brand name or entering the market later. Thus, the imitator
is an entrepreneur who has to take strategic decisions and develop improvements in his product. 
The second common belief, that the processes of  imitation are extremely detrimental to welfare, is, in part, a
consequence of  the information campaigns carried out by governmental institutions and lobbies in developed
countries. In a recent report, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2010) denounces the
proportions of  the phenomenon in the United States, where seizures of  goods infringing IPR (Intellectual
Property Rights) by the Department of  Homeland Security between 2004 and 2009 amounted to 1.118 million
dollars. The report itself  sets out a number of  potential effects related to the sale of  counterfeit and pirates
goods (see Table 1). 
Stakeholders Potencial negative effects Potential positive effects
Consumers
− Damage to health and safety 
− Costs incurred when product fails due to lower quality
of  counterfeit good 
− Perceived benefits from lower prices of  
counterfeit and pirated goods 
Industry
− Lost sales 
− Lost brand value or damage to public image 
− Cost of  IP protection 
− Decreased incentive to invest in R&D 
− Increased sales of  legitimate goods based 
on consumer "sampling" of  pirated goods 
Government
− Lost tax revenue due to illegal sales of  counterfeit and 
pirated goods 
− Cost of  IP enforcement 
− Risks of  counterfeits entering supply chains with 
national security or civilian safety implications 
Economy as a
whole
− Lower economic growth as a result of  reduced 
incentives to innovate 
− Lost revenue from declining U.S. trade in countries 
with weak IP rights regimes 
Table 1. Potential Direct Effects of  IPR Infringements in the United States by Stakeholder (GAO, 2010) 
As can be seen, the potential damage is greater than the benefits. This damage includes risks to health and safety,
waste of  public resources and lower economic growth. Innovative companies would be among the most
affected, as imitations are a threat to brands. The original products will be seen as less exclusive or may be
confused with lower quality copies. Thus, piracy, although it can be profitable for the imitator, creates a negative
externality for the innovator. The literature has given more weight to the potential negative impact of
counterfeiting than to the positive effects. In growth models based on R&D, imitation processes are usually seen
as harmful to growth, as competition reduces the potential benefits that innovators can obtain. The entry of
imitators can lead to them taking away part of  the social benefits generated by the innovators, since the imitators
incur very low costs compared to those of  the discoverer. Grossman and Helpman (1991b) consider that the
processes of  imitation are characteristic of  less developed production systems and end up being detrimental to
global economic growth due to their negative impact on innovation activities. 
Yet, while the references to the positive effects of  imitation are less numerous than the negative ones, some
economists have identified a number of  important benefits that imitation processes may have on economic
welfare, even in such controversial fields as incentives for innovation and growth. 
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The GAO report itself  notes some of  these effects, such as price reductions and advertising associated with sales
of  counterfeits. Consumers may be aware that the counterfeits are of  lower quality. Even so, these consumers
would not buy the original product because of  its high price, so they seek a product that is more affordable but
that, nevertheless, can enable them to enjoy a certain status. This practice can have negative consequences on
brand image of  the original, whose customers see how their exclusive and expensive products are not really so
unique. However, as Grossman and Shaphiro indicate (1988), piracy may also have positive effects because it can
mean a form of  publicity for the original brand and make the latter look even more exclusive to its products and
customers. Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006) agree with this argument. They consider that piracy maybe welfare-
increasing, in particular because it leads to market expansion (providing information about the characteristics and
value of  the product and facilitating the purchasing decision) and because selling physical products that are
complements to the information goods mitigates negative effect of  piracy on profits. Nevertheless, for Minniti
and Vergari (2010) the market expansion effect, that allows firms to reach new costumers, occurs in emerging
markets. On the contrary, in mature and widespread markets, firms prefer to be protected from piracy. 
Additionally, there are economists who argue that the monopoly power granted by patents to firms will have
implications for consumer welfare and may even have negative effects on innovation. For Blundell, Griffith and
Van Reenen, (1995), Nickell (1996) and Banerjee and Chatterjee (2010), the introduction of  the competition that
imitation introduces into innovation processes can have positive effects on the development of  new
technologies. Cheng and Tao (1999) believe that both innovation and imitation activities contribute to
technological advancement, although the role of  imitation activities is less recognized. The innovation process
will generate new technologies, but these are more easily spread through the processes of  imitation. This leads
the authors to assert that optimal technological policy should include the provision of  subsidies to both
innovation and imitation. Mukoyama (2003) shares this point of  view. For him, entrepreneurs need to learn from
the technologies developed by imitation to create their own technologies. Only the industry leaders within each
sector can create significant innovations, while outsiders can enter the sector through the imitation of  existing
technology and become technology leaders. Thus, the imitation process encourages innovative activity and
contributes to economic growth. Subsidizing imitation can be a way of  developing technological capacity and
enhancing competitiveness. Newly industrialized countries can imitate technologies developed in leader countries
and contribute to increasing global welfare, learning to use and adapt them and becoming next round innovators.
In this context, Sohn (2008) distinguishes between two possible effects of  imitations. One, he calls the
pessimistic effect, which causes a reduction of  innovation because of  the threat of  imitators, and the other, the
optimistic effect, which results in higher social welfare because of  the decline in marginal production costs due
to the use of  new technologies, either legally or illegally. For him, the optimistic effect is more important,
resulting in a net gain of  social welfare. 
With regard to the effects that imitation processes have on economic growth, Nelson (2007) recalls that, during
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in many developing countries, there were no property rights regimes
that restricted their companies from copying the innovations available in developed countries. These processes
of  imitation and adaptation of  technologies to specific needs can contribute decisively to the catching up
process, as developing countries can become technological powers. The IPR do not constitute an
insurmountable barrier if  you have the necessary endowments of  physical and human capital. In the words of
Nelson (2007, p.11), "as the [technological and economic] frontier is approached, the lines between sophisticated
imitation and creative design of  new products and processes becomes blurry". In fact, authors such as
Rosenberg and Steinmueller (1988), Khan and Sokoloff  (2006) and Sohn (2008) point out that in countries like
Japan, Korea and the United States, imitative activities have contributed decisively to their economic success.
Moreover, Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) highlight how, in many developing countries, entrepreneurs or the states
themselves have carried out innovative initiatives that have been imitated with great success by other
entrepreneurs. This has contributed to development and prosperity. The authors give examples of  garments in
Bangladesh, cut flowers in Colombia, IT in India and salmon in Chile. It is very unlikely that other local
entrepreneurs would have dared to venture into these projects without knowing that the initiative could be
profitable. Imitation processes allow punters to bet on winning horses and generate prosperity. In each of  the
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cases referred to, the entry of  imitators who incorporated some better management is what permitted the local
industry to grow, although competition caused some inconveniences for the first entrepreneurs. 
Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghi (2006), Aghion, Boustan, Hoxby and Vandenbussche (2006), Aghion and
Howitt (2009), Islam (2010) and López-Pueyo, Barcenilla and Gimenez (In press) relate the processes of
innovation and imitation to the degree of  development of  economies. They conclude that both processes have a
key role in growth. On the one hand, the closer the countries are to the technological frontier, the more
important the innovation processes will be and, therefore, the more they will invest in higher education. On the
contrary, the farther the countries are from the technology frontier, the more important the processes of
imitation will be for growth and, therefore, the better it will be to invest in basic educational levels, which are
more closely linked to the uptake and use of  foreign technologies. Based on the same idea, Perez-Sebastian
(2007) develops a model in which imitation is the main source of  productivity growth in the early stages of
development, while, as economies approach the technology frontier, innovation becomes the engine of  growth. 
In sum we can conclude that, although the negative effects of  imitation (especially on innovation) are often
overemphasized, imitation processes can have important positive effects on economic activity: lowering prices
and production costs, reducing the monopoly deadweight loss associated to patents, helping to spread new ideas,
allowing groups excluded for economic reasons to access goods, promoting competition in business and
innovation activities, encouraging efficiency, spurring the development of  new innovations adapted to local
needs, contributing with ideas and reducing risk in the development of  local industries and, finally, helping
emerging countries, that are further away from the technology frontier, to converge technologically and
economically. 
3. Strength of  the patent system, innovation and imitation 
The strength of  the patent system substantially affects the development of  imitation. We have just seen how the
processes of  imitation can have significant positive effects on economic activity. Therefore, the following
question arises: Does a strengthening of  the patent system have economic benefits for society? Although
Sections 4 and 5 of  the paper will address this issue more fully, first we need to know the mechanisms by which
to design a strong patent system and the theoretical arguments used to justify it, the way in which it conditions
the processes of  innovation and imitation, and its possible effects, both positive and negative, on economic
activity. Though intellectual property rights (IPR) include other legal figures -such as copyrights, trademarks,
designs and utility models-, when we use the term IPR, we are referring mainly to patents, and we will use the
two terms indistinctly. 
With regard to the mechanisms that can be used to strengthen the patent  system, Andersen (2006, pp. 11-12)
notes that the main tools would be: (i) length of  IPR protection obtained, (ii) the type of  knowledge or creative
expression protected (iii) the scope of  knowledge protected (iv) the inventive step (v) the licensing law (for
example, should we allow the opportunity to block competition or should we opt for compulsory licensing?) and
(vi) the costs of  and procedures for obtaining and holding a right, and the type and costs of  the remedies
available for infringement. Another essential element is to provide human and technical resources for the patent
offices and the judicial system since, excluding the U.S., where there has been a specialized court to settle patent
cases since 1982, in other countries, judges are not specialized in such cases nor, indeed, have the necessary
technical and economic knowledge (Cooper, 1993). Finally, it should be said that the instruments used to
strengthen the patent system not only require an improvement in the design and implementation of  the laws, but
also a strengthening of  private institutions and mechanisms, available to patent holders, on which the current
system relies on. 
The fundamental reason put forward to advocate for a strengthening of  patent systems is that this can be a
critical incentive for innovation. The issue of  strengthening IPR protection has transcended local scenarios and
has become a major issue in economic relations between countries. We have to keep in mind that the fact that
most of  the technology stock is in rich countries leads them to have strong economic interests in promoting
international respect for IPR. Furthermore, these countries are suffering a growing offshoring of  their activities
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to developing economies and, in the exploitation of  IPR, through the direct sale of  technology and the payment
of  licensing or royalty fees, they see a source of  income from activities in which they still have a significant
competitive advantage. That is why the most developed countries consider all matters related to IPR protection
as a key in the design of  trade policy in a globalized world. Rich countries have been aware of  their importance
for many years and have sought to establish a system of  protection of  these property rights by signing
international agreements such as the Berne or Paris conventions or the more modern Trade-Related Aspects of
the Intellectual Property Rights Section (TRIPS) of  the World Trade Organization (WTO). These agreements
have provided a major breakthrough in the strengthening of  IPR globally. However, some politicians feel that the
new international agreements on TRIPS can harm developing countries, since these countries either do not
innovate or their innovation activities are very poor. This means that they would become just dependent clients
of  the rich countries, which would receive a net flow of  capital from licensing or royalty fees.
We can find the same disagreements about the strengthening of  IPR among economists, especially in regard to
how they affect the least developed countries. On the one hand, authors such as Maskus (2000) argue that
progress in IPR can have positive effects on trade and technology transfer. This involves the replacement of  the
processes of  imitation by legal transfers, through licensing fees, which, in his opinion, will have a positive
outcome because they are lower than the costs of  imitation. This view is shared by Khan and Sokoloff  (2006),
who give the example of  the benefits obtained by the United States through the development of  its patent
system in the early stages of  industrialization. This institution favoured the creation of  new technologies and the
reception of  foreign technologies and allowed "ordinary people", who otherwise would have been disadvantaged,
to develop and exploit commercially significant discoveries through what the authors call "the role of  institutions
in fostering democratic invention", p.124. Based on the U.S. experience, we can infer that a development of  IPR
would have more positive effects in newly industrialized countries than many economists and politicians believe.
Park and Ginarte (1997) and Park and Lippoldt (2008) empirically test the positive effects of  strengthening the
IPR system by constructing a proxy variable that tries to measure the degree of  IPR protection in various
countries through the quantification of  qualitative legal elements. Their findings demonstrate the possible
positive effects, such as incentives to trade, reception of  foreign investments and technologies, incentives to
invest in R&D, and incentives to create own technologies and export them. In addition, the authors find that
these effects are greater if  there are a number of  complementary factors associated, such as the quality of
infrastructure, the availability of  trained human capital, the quality of  knowledge institutions (such as academia,
public research institutes and industrial research centres), the government policies and regulations, the market
structure, the financial system and the availability of  networks for research collaboration or interaction. 
However, Falvey, Greenaway and Foster (2006) found that, although the positive effects on the development of
IPR are clearer in the case of  richer and poorer countries, for middle-income newly industrialized countries,
stronger IPR may lead to a decline in the activities of  imitation and, therefore, in the production and assimilation
of  new technologies. For North (2005), the creation of  patent laws has been an important part of  the effort to
make the markets of  developed countries more efficient. However, the application of  these institutional changes
to third world economies can lead to political instability and alter the distribution of  income, producing negative
and undesirable consequences. 
Merges and Nelson (1994) point out that a patent policy that is too strict could discourage innovation and
impede technical progress. They indicate that there are numerous examples of  economies where there has been a
rapid technical advance even if  the protection of  IPR has been weak. Other authors are cautious too about
recommending a strengthening of  the patent system because of  its impact on imitation and due to the beneficial
effects of  imitation. Klinger and Lederman (2006) point out that, initially, it may be assumed that the threat of
imitators can inhibit innovation processes. In theory, the greater the barriers to entry and monopoly power, the
lower the threat of  imitators and the greater the incentive for innovators to generate discoveries and to expand
the range of  products for export. However, the econometric evidence presented in their paper shows that, if  the
barriers to entry are high, potential imitators cannot take advantage of  the spillovers generated by entrepreneurs
or stimulate new export sectors. Thus, it is important to note that an increase in the barriers to entry does not
necessarily result in more discoveries. These barriers tend to occur in economies where private initiative is
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underdeveloped and can lead to the concentration of  economic activity in a few sectors. By contrast, imitation
activities involve greater competition and lead to the allocation of  scarce resources to more profitable activities.
Excessive protection may lead to a lack of  diversification and the protection of  inefficiency. 
Greenhalgh and Rogers (2010) identify a number of  reasons why the patent system can be detrimental, both to
the development of  innovation and to growth. Firms sometimes use patents as a strategy to increase the costs of
production of  new firms, which raises entry barriers in technology-intensive sectors. This problem can be
especially acute for smaller companies who find it more difficult to pay the licenses to innovators. Moreover,
patent races to see who patents first when firms are researching in the same field cause an apparent waste of
resources and lead to inefficiencies. Finally, patents hinder sequential or cumulative innovation. In an analysis of
the problems of  the U.S. patent system, Bessen and Meurer (2008) detected this aspect, finding firms that do not
emit licenses or require exorbitant prices for the use of  their patents. These authors also show the high costs of
maintaining the system and the patents themselves. 
Despite increasing globalization and the international harmonization of  laws, each country is free to legislate on
patents and there are enormous differences between countries both in legislative aspects and, above all, in the
way that the laws are interpreted. We have to keep in mind that small nuances in the interpretation of  the rules
can lead to big differences in safeguarding property rights. 
In conclusion, as Scotchmer (2004) stresses, although we tend to think that strengthening the patent system is
always a good idea that leads to the generation of  more innovation, this view is too simplistic because, among
other reasons, protection systems that are too strong can trigger high deadweight loss due to the monopoly that
patents grant, discourage second-round innovations and contribute to the overlap of  R&D costs as firms
compete to innovate and be the first to obtain restrictive exploitation rights. Therefore, as we will show in the
following sections, strengthening the patent system does not necessarily lead to higher industry profits or more
social welfare. 
The models that we develop can be applied to wide set of  products, services and contexts. We can think in
innovators and imitators interacting in the same market or in an international context, in which innovators and
imitators coexist in a competitive international scenario. 
4. Strength of  the patent system and industry profits 
The strength of  the patent system will condition whether imitators can get their products into the market and
stay there. Since the presence of  imitators entails negative consequences for innovative firms although, as we
have shown, it has some significant economic benefits, the purpose of  this section is to provide answers to the
following questions: i) Are industry profits higher in the absence of  imitators? and ii) Does an improvement in
the effectiveness of  the patent system lead to an increase in these profits? 
To do this, we will consider that the industry is made up of  two firms: the innovator, who develops a new
technology and exploits the monopoly power granted by the patent, and the imitator, who uses the innovation
illegally, with varying degrees of  success depending on how strong the protection mechanisms of  the patent are.
Initially, the innovator incurs R&D costs that we will call CR&D. The mere undertaking of  the project of
innovation does not guarantee success: risk is inherent in any innovation process. Let xi be a discrete random
variable that represents the possibility of  the success (x1=1) or failure (x2=0) of  the innovation project. Let p(xi)
be the associated probability function. The corresponding distribution of  the probability of  success in the
innovation project, S, will, therefore, has a dichotomous nature, its expected value being: 
E[S] = x1p (S = x1) + x2p (S = x2)      (1)
If  the research project is successful, the innovator will patent the resulting idea, which will allow its commercial
use in exclusivity during the patent life. When a new technology is commercialized, it often goes through
different stages during its life cycle, from its introduction into the market until it finally becomes obsolete. The
process of  adoption and diffusion of  technology has been extensively studied in the economic literature.
Stoneman (2002) and Rogers (2003) analyse various methodological proposals that model this process. One of
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the most widely accepted models proposes a Normal distribution of  innovation users over time. It is based on
the existing differences in tastes, location, needs and consumer habits that lead to the diffusion process of
innovation not being uniform among consumers. Following this model, Rogers (2003) suggests that consumers
who adopt the technology can be divided into five categories based on standard deviations from the average and
depending on the time at which they start to use it: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority and
laggards, as shown in Figure 1. 
Note: The figure shows the evolution of  the fraction of  demand adopting the technology along time.
Figure 1. Technology diffusion process based on the Normal distribution
From this figure, we can obtain the cumulative distribution function, which will indicate the percentage of  users
of  the innovation compared with the total potential users over time. It adopts an S-shape, reflecting that the
small number of  initial users grows with a slope of  the curve; which first increases and, then, decreases when it
reaches the top of  the Normal distribution. The slope is always positive until it reaches the saturation point,
where all potential users have acquired the technology and the innovation is replaced by a new one, according to
the Schumpeterian creative destruction principle. 
Formally, the technological diffusion model we adopt follows this logistic function: 
Y t=
1
1+e−(δ 1+δ 2 t )
 t~N(0,1)    (2)
where Yt represents the proportion of  potential users that have adopted the technology in period t. δ1 is a
constant of  integration that positions the curve on the time scale an δ2 the parameter that indicates the speed of
technology adoption. The life cycle of  the technology, which will coincide with the period of  the patent term, is
given by T, with limt→T Y t=1
The profits generated over the innovation lifetime are given by the cumulative distribution. For each period,
profits are distributed based on the number of  users, given the constant of  integration and the rate of  adoption
or slope. If  the innovator sells the product exclusively, thanks to the patent, he will seize all the earnings, Ginn,
over the period T of  monopoly. 
Thus, the potential profit of  an innovative firm, assuming the patent is working efficiently and that there are no
imitators in the market, will be Binn, and it will take into account the probability of  success of  the innovation
project, the costs of  R&D and the profits generated by marketing the product throughout its lifetime: 
 Binn=
E [S ]Ginn
1+e−(δ 1+δ 2T )
−CR&D (3)
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However, the presence of  only non-imitative firms in the market is an unrealistic assumption. It is difficult to
protect IPR effectively and it is common for innovation activities and patents to co-exist with imitation processes
that are benefiting illegally from the patented ideas. The fact that the patent is a document available publicly,
contributes to its knowledge and diffusion, and means that the innovator assumes a potential risk. No legal
system can fully guarantee the protection of  IPR. As noted earlier, the strength of  the patent system comes from
its design and from the efforts of  public and private institutions and of  the patent holders themselves. The
degree of  protection will determine how innovative and imitative firms interact in the market and compete to
capture the potential profits generated, and conditions two elements: 
• The time during which the innovator can act as a monopolist. 
• The proportion of  profits that the imitator can take away from the innovative firm once the imitations
are introduced into the market. 
We define f as the variable that quantifies how effectively the rights generated by patents are safeguarded. 
ϕ=f (i)∀ i∈ℝn∃ϕ∈[0,1]  (4)
It takes values ranging from f = 0, which implies that the patent system is completely ineffective, to f = 1, which
means that the system is fully effective and, therefore, there are no imitators in the market. 
If  the patent system does not work effectively and two firms, one the innovator and the other the imitator, can
live in the market, there is a new scenario, in which we can distinguish two periods: 
P1 is a period in which the patent holder can exploit the patent on an exclusive basis. The innovative firm
is alone in the market and wields monopoly power -the higher the parameter f, the longer the period- and
obtains a profit: 
Binn
P 1=
E [S]Ginn
1+e−(δ 1+δ2T ϕ)
−CR&D  (5)
P2 is a period in which the imitating firm competes with the patent holder. While the innovation diffusion
function depends on the tastes of  consumers and remains unchanged, other changes occur in the potential gains,
which are now Gimi. These changes are due to the imitating firm selling their copies at a price less than or equal to
the monopoly price, among other reasons because the imitation costs that it has to bear are lower than the costs
of  innovation (iCR&D ≥ Cimi). The lower price of  the imitations will reduce the number of  units sold by the
company holding the patent and even, possibly, the price of  the original product. Therefore, Gi nn ≥ Gimi. The
strength of  the patent, as measured by the parameter f, determines the time that the imitating firm remains in
the market and the proportion of  earnings that it can take away from the innovator. Given that the costs of
development of  the innovation have already been included in the previous period, the profits of  the two
companies will be given by: 
Binn
P 2=E [S ]Gimiϕ[
1
1+e−(δ 1+δ 2T )
− 1
1+e−(δ 1+δ 2T ϕ)
] (6)
Binn
P 2=Gimi(1−ϕ)[
1
1+e−(δ 1+δ 2T )
− 1
1+e−(δ 1+δ 2T ϕ)
]−C imi (7)
Table 2 summarizes the above, taking into account the benefits that these scenarios, derived from the strength of
the patent system, mean for the industry. If  the patent system works effectively, the innovator is the only firm
that is profitable. If  the patent system does not work effectively, the innovator will coexist for a while with the
imitating firm. The time during which they coexist and the profits obtained by each of  the firms will depend on
the strength of  the patent system. 
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Table 2. Strength of  the patent system and benefits for industry
Table 2 will help us to answer the two questions posed initially. The first is whether the benefits generated in the
industry with an efficient patent system, in which only the innovator exploits the innovation, are superior to
those of  a scenario in which the patent system is inefficient and allows the coexistence, albeit limited, of  the
innovator and the imitator. This can be answered considering: 
Binn>Binn
P 1+Binn
P2+Bimi
P 2↔Binn−(Binn
P1+Binn
P 2+Bimi
P 2)>0  (8)
Calculating the inequality (8) yields: 
That is, in general, it cannot be said that the industry profits generated when the patent system ensures that the
innovator exploits the patented product under a monopoly are higher than those earned in the presence of
imitators. 
To address the second issue, that is, whether an improvement in the effectiveness of  the patent system will lead
to an increase in the profits of  the industry, we must ask how changes in f affect the total industry profits.
Formally: 
d (Binn
P1 +Binn
P2 +Bimi
P2 )
d ϕ
=
eδ1 (eδ2T−eδ 2T ϕ)(−1+E [S])Ginn
(1+eδ1+δ 2T )(1+eδ1+δ 2T ϕ) {><=}0  (10)
Thus, in general, it cannot be said that a stronger patent system will lead to an increase in industry profits. 
To sum up, in both the cases described, the result depends on the strength of  the patent system, the probability
of  success of  the innovation project, the specific characteristics of  the copy -which, together with the strength
of  the patent regime, will determine the differences in gains between the two firms- and on how the innovation
is diffused in the market. In the first case, moreover, it depends on the value of  the costs of  imitation. These
results lead us to reconsider the adequacy of  industrial and innovation policies that impulsively advocate a
stronger patent system, a comprehensive analysis of  the relevant variables being necessary. 
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5. Strength of  the patent system and social welfare 
Patents ensure that innovative firms can sell their products on an exclusive basis, which means that the sale price
is above the marginal cost of  production. However, for the patent holder, the relevant production cost is not the
marginal, but the average cost. Only a sale price equal to or greater than the average cost will allow him to
recover his high investment in R&D. The recovery of  these costs is one of  the main arguments to justify the
monopoly exploitation of  new ideas. However, the patent system leads to a market that works inefficiently, since
society has to bear the presence of  a deadweight loss and, consequently, a social welfare loss. This is due to the
fact that some consumers are willing to pay a price above the marginal cost for the product but, as this price is
below the monopoly price, they will be outside the market. This is one of  the main reasons why the patent
system is questioned by some economists and many potential consumers. So, is social welfare bigger if  the patent
system works efficiently and the innovator is the only one who exploits the innovation? Can the presence of  an
imitator increase social welfare? 
Figure 2 shows patent monopoly and welfare. The innovative firm sells x(pm) units of  product at the monopoly
price pm. We assume that the marginal cost of  producing each unit is zero. As Romer (1990) suggests, the
assumption of  low or close to zero marginal costs is common in the case of  innovations that require high R&D
costs. Therefore, area S, which is below the demand curve D, represents the consumer surplus that would accrue
in a competitive market. S = S(p + w + e), with p + w + e = 1. Deadweight loss will be eS. The net social
welfare is calculated by subtracting the initial costs of  development of  the innovation, CR&D, from the innovator
gains and the consumer surplus, that is: S(p + w) - CR&D. To find the total social welfare in the life of  the
innovation, which we believe coincides with the period of  exploitation of  the patent, T, we have to multiply the
social welfare of  each period by T, resulting in: TS(p + w) - CR&D. 
Figure 2. Patent monopoly and welfare
As noted above, to consider that the patent system works effectively and that there are no imitators is an
unrealistic assumption. So, let us suppose the presence of  an imitating firm which is in the market together with
the innovative firm. The activity of  the imitating firm will be marked by the effectiveness of  the patent system.
Again, we use the variable f to quantify how effectively the rights generated by patents are safeguarded. It takes
values ranging from f = 0, which implies that the patent system is absolutely ineffective, to f = 1, which means
that the system is fully effective and, therefore, there are no imitators in the market. 
ϕ= f (i)∀ i∈ℝn∃ϕ∈[0,1]  (11)
Any ineffectiveness in the functioning of  the patent system and the presence of  imitators are usually seen as
economic inefficiencies that reduce social welfare. But, can the presence of  an imitator in the market increase
social welfare? To answer this question, we will consider two scenarios: a baseline scenario in which the patent
system works effectively and a second in which ineffectiveness in the operation of  the patent system allows the
existence of  an imitator. Both are depicted in Figure 3. In the second scenario, the fact that a competitor offers a
similar product at a lower price will mean a decline in sales. This is represented by a shift in the demand curve,
which passes from D1 to D2. The imitator will have a demand curve D3, which will allow him to sell ximi units at a
price Pimi < Pm. This differentiated demand curve arises because consumers perceive differences associated with
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product quality, brand image and customer service, among others. We will use Figure 3 to calculate changes in
the social surplus associated with the two scenarios. 
Figure 3. Innovator, imitator and social welfare 
Scenario 1: in which the patent system works effectively, f = 1. 
The social surplus is given by the sum of  the innovator gains and the consumer surplus generated in each period
minus the development costs of  innovation: 
SS1 = T (π1 + π2 + w1 + w2)  S1 - CR&D     (12)
Scenario 2: in which the patent system does not work effectively, Φϵ [0,1 ) .
We can distinguish two periods: 
P1 is the period in which the patent holder can exploit it on an exclusive basis. 
To calculate the social surplus associated with the innovator when it is the only firm in the market, we must take
into account that the period of  exclusivity will be Tf : 
SS2,P1 = T f (π1 + π2 + w1 + w2)  S1 - CR&D     (13)
P2 is the period in which the imitating firm competes with the patent holder. 
For the rest of  the lifecycle of  innovation, T(1-f), the innovator will coexist with the imitator and total social
surplus, bearing in mind that we have already accounted for CI+D, and that the costs of  imitation are given by Cimi,
will be: 
SS2,P2 = T(1-f) [(π2 + w2)  S1 + (π3  + w3) S2 ]- Cimi     (14)
Table 3 summarizes the above, and shows the social surplus arising from the scenarios that represent the
strength of  the patent system. If  the patent system works effectively, consumers may choose to purchase the
innovation at the monopoly price set by the patent holder. If  the patent system does not work effectively,
consumers will be able to choose between the patented product and its copy. The length of  the time during
which the copy is supplied depends on the strength of  the patent system. The imitating firm incurs a cost of
imitation that is lower than the initial innovation sunk costs that the innovating firm supports. This guarantees
that the imitator can supply the product at a price that may be lower than the average production cost, which is
the limit price for the innovator. This allows more consumers to choose to consume the good, resulting in an
increase in consumer surplus and a social gain. 
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Table 3. Strength of  the patent system and social welfare
To test when the net social surplus is higher (when the patent system works effectively or in the presence of
imitators), we will calculate the variation that occurs in the net social surplus when the imitator enters the market.
We will have to calculate the net social surplus, that is, after discounting, first, the deadweight loss associated with
a higher selling price than the marginal cost and, second, the initial costs of  innovation and imitation, CR&D and
Cimi. Social welfare will be higher when the patent system efficient if, and only if: 
SS1 - SS2,P1  - SS2,P2 > 0     (15) 
That is, if: 
T (π1 + π2 + w1 + w2)  S1 - CR&D - Tf (π1 + π2 + w1 + w2) S1 + CR&D - T(1-f) [(π2 + w2) S1 + (π3 + w3) S2 ]
+ Cimi > 0  ⇔  T(1-f) [(π1 + w1)  S1 - (π3 + w3) S2] < Cimi  ⇔   T(1-f) [(π3 + w3) S2 - ( π1 + w1)  S1] > Cimi
From this expression, we can extract the following corollaries: 
Corollary 1: The social surplus generated by a patent system that works effectively and with no imitators in the
market will be greater than the social surplus generated by a patent system that works ineffectively and with
imitators in the market if, and only if, the difference between the consumer net surplus of  the innovator and the
imitator -after discounting the deadweight losses produced during the time that both firms are in the market and
the gains generated by selling at a price higher than the marginal cost- is less than the imitation costs that the
imitator has to bear to get the product into the market. 
Corollary 2: The social surplus generated by a patent system that works ineffectively and with imitators in the
market will be greater than the social surplus generated by a patent system that works effectively and with no
imitators in the market if, and only if, the difference between the consumer net surplus of  the innovator and the
imitator -after discounting the deadweight losses produced during the time that both firms are in the market and
the gains generated by selling at a price higher than the marginal cost- is greater than the imitation costs that the
imitator has to bear to get the product into the market. 
Therefore, it cannot be said that the social surplus is greater if  the patent system is strengthened, since it will
depend on the magnitude of  the costs of  imitation and the demand characteristics of  the innovator and the
imitator, that is, on product differentiation and on their elasticities of  demand. We will have to analyse all these
elements with caution before we advocate for policies based on a strengthening of  patent systems for the sake of
greater social welfare. 
6. Concluding Remarks
In these pages, we have shown how the literature on innovation has often seen the imitation process as harmful
to the development of  innovation, bad for growth and detrimental to the welfare of  consumers, producers and
society at large. That is why policies aimed at strengthening the patent system and discouraging imitation
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processes are associated with improvements in social welfare, -fostering innovation, trade, foreign investment
and technology transfer. 
Although the negative effects are always emphasized, imitation processes can have significant positive effects on
economic activity. Among these, we could highlight that they encourage innovative activity and constitute a first
step in developing their own innovations, contributing decisively to the process of  convergence among the
countries further away and closer to the technological frontier. They also stimulate competition in innovation
processes, allow excluded consumers access to products, may represent advertising for the original brand, help to
disseminate new ideas and stimulate the development of  new innovations adapted to local needs. 
Hence, the strengthening of  patent systems could cause a decline in the activities of  imitation and, therefore, a
decrease in competition, a reduction in the production and assimilation of  new technologies and could create
barriers to entry into technology-intensive sectors, increasing the costs of  production. 
Consequently, as we have shown: 
• In general, it cannot be said that the profits generated in the industry when the patent system ensures
that the innovator exploits the patented innovation under monopoly are higher than those produced in
the presence of  imitators. Nor can it be said that a stronger patent system will lead to an increase in
industry profits. The result will depend on many factors, such as the probability of  success of  the
innovation project, the characteristics of  the copy, the imitation costs and the manner in which the
innovation is diffused in the market. 
• Neither can we say that, if  the patent system ensures that there are no imitators in the market, social
surplus will be higher, since it will depend on factors such as the costs of  imitation, the differentiation
between the copy and the original product and their elasticity of  demand. 
All this should lead us to rethink how optimal innovation policy should be d esigned. This should help to
reconcile incentives to innovate and social welfare maximization. In line with the arguments used by Boldrin and
Levine (2008), discoverers have the right to own and sell their ideas, but not to control them once they are sold,
which in legal terms is known as the exhaustion or first sale doctrine. Market mechanisms can effectively reward
innovators for being the first to bring a product into the market, without the need to g rant a monopoly. Thus,
the problems associated with restrictions on the free market, because of  the monopoly conferred by patents,
especially by limiting the use of  new ideas by other innovators, involve costs that outweigh the social benefits
that patents can provide. 
There are well-known examples on how an innovation system that shares knowledge without restraints can
encourage innovation; and hence economic activity and social welfare. In the 1980's and 1990's, when the first
treatments to fight AIDS epidemic appeared, they had a very high cost. This made impossible, for patients in
poor countries, to access treatment. The powerful Indian pharmaceutical industry began to copy the patented
drugs in 2000. This allowed a huge reduction in their price and facilitated access to treatment. Many poor
countries benefited. In addition, Indian practices allowed the combination of  several drugs in a single pill, which
both reduced the production costs and made treatment more effective. All this could not be done with the patent
laws in vigour. 
As a result of  this and other similar cases, in recent years, different social movements have emerged demanding
free access to knowledge. A good example are free software communities, which share an open source. In a
society where access to software is becoming a key aspect linked to the success in education and work, this
software can be freely modified, redistributed and used. Another one is the use of  the current IPR system, but
under new forms -such as creative commons and patent lefts- that allow sharing innovations and facilitate their
use. 
This 'collective knowledge' is making knowledge more equitable and accessible. The evaluation of  the economic
impact of  these new forms of  sharing knowledge will be a fundamental line of  research in the coming years.
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Thus, the calculation of  the economic value that represents open licenses, free software and some aspects of  the
collaborative economy related to the diffusion of  knowledge means to test empirically the importance of  free
knowledge diffusion for businesses and society. This type of  research will suppose an empirical extension of  the
models developed in these pages and will back the ideas showed. 
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